The importance of dividend income and its reinvestment in achieving strong equity returns has been well documented. In the 2006 Barclays Equity Gilt Study it is reported that if £100 had been invested in UK stocks in 1899, and all dividend income reinvested, it would be worth £13,311 in real terms in 2006. The same £100 without reinvestment of income would be worth just £213. Whilst the consistency of income in aggregate has long been viewed as an attractive proposition, it is only recently that this issue has been studied more intensively at the individual stock level. Recent years have seen the emergence of exchange traded funds (ETF) in the US that consist solely of equities that have a history of consistent dividend increases.
2 These ETFs include the S&P Dividend Aristocrats that require 25-years of consistent dividend growth for inclusion and the Mergent Dividend Achievers that stipulate 10-years of continuous growth. It is reported that not only have these strategies outperformed comparable benchmark indices such as the S&P 500 but they have also done so with lower volatility.
3 This is not the first time that stock strategies have been derived using dividend-based rules.
Perhaps the most famous is the "Dogs of the Dow" approach devised by O'Higgins and Downes (1992) . Essentially this seeks to capture the well-researched return premium that has been attributable to stocks with a high dividend yield (see Keim, 1985, and Christie, 1990 , for more details) by choosing the stocks with the largest yields from within the Dow Jones Industrial Average, holding them for a year and then repeating the methodology.
Whilst this approach has generated excess returns relative to the index, it has also suffered from higher volatility and frequently failed to beat the index when risk-adjustment and transaction costs were included (see McQueen et al, 1997, and ap Gwilym et al, 2005) .
In aggregate, the US has seen a trend away from companies paying dividends during the last quarter of a century. Both Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al (2004) describe how the proportion of US industrial firms making distributions fell from around two-thirds in 1978 to just one-fifth in 2000. Recent years have seen something of a mini-revival, as documented by Julio and Ikenberry (2004) , but the level remains historically depressed. To some extent the demise of dividends is not quite as intense as outwardly suggested. For example, DeAngelo et al (2004) also find that dividend payments in real terms increased during the period of their study but that many of the smaller firms that previously paid dividends had been acquired or dropped out of the sample for other reasons. The new listings during the period failed to pay sufficient dividends to make up the shortfall and the percentage of payers declined, although the large payers grew by so much that the aggregate payment kept increasing. This has lead to a concentration of dividends amongst relatively few US stocks.
The United Kingdom has a history of firms paying dividends, even though it too has experienced a (less dramatic) decline in the latter part of the twentieth century. Benito and Young (2001) report that in 1979 around 95% of UK firms paid dividends, which fell to 75% in 1999. Intermediate troughs in payments were also observed during periods of recession. As in the US, there have been signs in recent years of resurgence in dividend payments with the proportion of payers starting to increase again.
4
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between consistent dividend growth and stock returns. We focus on the UK market since the high proportion of dividend payers is likely to enable the formation of well-diversified portfolios of stocks. In particular, we examine the number of years of consistent growth required before outperformance, if any, is captured and how the return performance compares with firms that pay inconsistent dividends or no dividends at all. Furthermore, we introduce additional filters, such as dividend yield, to the sample of dividend growers in an effort to discern whether there are any 'value' or 'growth' effects also present.
Data and Methodology
The data is obtained from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) for the period . A firm is classified as a dividend payer if it paid a cash dividend, regular or otherwise, during the previous twelve months. If the firm pays out a greater cash dividend in the most recent twelve months compared to the prior twelve months then it is classified as having had a year of dividend growth. All dividends are measured net of tax, as this is the usual convention for companies to report. The assessment of dividend growth is made annually at the end of each calendar year. If a firm initiates a dividend payment within the year, this does not constitute a year of dividend growth. All firms within the LSPD are eligible for inclusion within the sample with the exception of investment trusts and other similar investment vehicles.
Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each calendar year on an equally weighted basis unless otherwise stated in the text, and held for a period of twelve months before rebalancing occurs. If a firm within a portfolio is delisted but there is value remaining, e.g. it is acquired, then the value is reinvested amongst the other constituents. Should a firm be delisted but there is no value remaining, e.g. it becomes bankrupt, then a full 100% loss is assumed and is taken in the month that the 'death' is recorded in the LSPD. If a firm that has been a consistent dividend growth firm cuts its dividend during a year, it remains held in the portfolio until the end of the 12 months when rebalancing takes place.
Consistent Dividend Growth
There are a number of good reasons why investors should favour companies that have a consistent history of increasing dividends. Firstly, one of the components in Gordon's (1962) constant growth valuation model is the growth term. It takes a much greater leap of faith to assume a future growth rate when there has been no precedent set in recent years compared to a stock that has a long-term growth rate already demonstrated. Secondly, Lintner (1956) observes that management only raise dividends when they believe that earnings have permanently increased. This implies that firms that continually increase their payments envisage a positive outlook for profitability. Thirdly, Barth et al (1999) show that firms with a pattern of increasing earnings have been accorded higher price-earnings ratios after controlling for growth and risk. Given that in the long-run dividends and earnings are inexorably linked, this appears to bode well for the valuations of consistent dividend payers.
Finally, Arnott and Asness (2003) demonstrate that, in aggregate, higher dividend payouts are consistent with higher future earnings growth. Walker (2005) supports the case for investments in consistent payers. In the 10 years to April 2005, it is stated that a basket of US securities with at least 10-years of consistent dividend growth outperformed the S&P 500 by 3.28% per annum coupled with the advantage of two percentage points lower volatility. benchmarks. Of these, the All-LSPD portfolio probably performed better due to the "smallfirm" effect with a far larger number of these stocks than the All-Share index.
The market-weighted results present a very different picture. The CAGR for the consistent dividend portfolios falls below the benchmark in most cases. In addition, the 10-year portfolios no longer always outperform the 5-year groups. Furthermore, returns during 2001-02 now also look similar to the broader market performance. improved Sharpe ratios for the dividend portfolios compared to the benchmarks. A minor detraction for the growth portfolios is that they are more negatively skewed than the benchmarks, particularly the All-LSPD portfolio. We note that investors prefer high first and third moments and low second and fourth moments (e.g. Scott and Horvath, 1980) . Whilst the growth portfolios have lower variance of returns, they also experience lower drawdowns.
The worst period for the 10-year portfolio during 1986-2006 saw a drawdown (on an end of month basis) of 30.42% compared to 42.98% for the All-Share and 44.92% for the All-LSPD.
From 1991 onwards the worst drawdown for the 10-year growth portfolio was 23.72%. These lower drawdowns are also reflected in lower Ulcer indices, which measure the depth and duration of drawdowns from peaks. frames. The higher volatility is also accompanied by increases in the maximum drawdowns of around 10-15%, plus higher Ulcer index levels and lower Martin ratios. The conclusion is rapidly drawn that for consistent dividend portfolios to be successful they should be formed on an equally weighted basis; otherwise there is no real advantage in diverting from the benchmark. The equal versus value-weighted issue might in itself explain some of the outperformance of comparable US ETFs versus the market-capitalization approach of the S&P 500 described by Walker (2005) .
With dividend strategies such as the "Dogs of the Dow", one problem is that the portfolios hold relatively few stocks, sometimes as few as five, and this leads to high volatility that mitigates the benefits of any additional return. and over 90% in the top of half of firms by market value. This suggests that transaction costs should not be unreasonable in executing such a strategy, as bid-ask spreads should be narrow and reasonable quantities of shares can be transacted without undue slippage. In addition, because the qualification for joining the portfolios is quite arduous in terms of the time duration required to qualify, the turnover of stocks at annual rebalancing is relatively low.
Despite the evidence of Figure 1 , Tables 1 and 2 suggest that size is likely to be influential.
The equally weighted portfolios markedly outperformed the market-capitalization weighted equivalents. Table 3 investigates this further by reporting findings from forming quartiles based on market value from those stocks with 10 or more years of consistent dividend growth. As expected, the CAGR is negatively related to market capitalization. In addition, the volatility of the smaller quartiles is also lower, along with the maximum drawdowns. This leads to markedly higher Sharpe and Martin ratios for the smallest two quartiles compared to the larger equivalents. Small, consistent dividend-growing stocks thus look to have been an attractive investment historically.
The Level of Dividends
Whilst the stipulation for inclusion in the consistent growth portfolios is the continual increasing of distributions to shareholders, it says nothing about the level of dividends that firms pay. It could be that firms have extremely low dividend yields, either because of low payout ratios or because stock prices have been bid up to extreme valuations. Figure 2 suggests that this is not the case. The dividend yield on the equally weighted consistent growth portfolio is actually quite similar to that of an equally weighted portfolio of stocks from the All-Share Index; 7 in fact on an annual average basis it has been slightly higher, with a net yield of 3.38% versus 3.20% for the All-Share Index. It can be seen that the yields have where, R 10 is the annual return on the equally weighted portfolio of stocks with 10 or more years of consistent growth, R ALL is the annual return on the equally weighted portfolio of stocks from the All-Share Index and D 10 and D ALL are the respective dividend yields at the beginning of each year.
In an effort to explain the differences between the consistent growth stocks and the rest of the stock universe, Table 4 splits the stocks into four categories; non-dividend payers, 8 stocks which pay dividends but with 4 years or less of consistent growth, those with 5 to 9 years of consistent growth and those with 10 years or more. The most immediate observation is the exceptionally poor performance of the zero-dividend firms, particularly those larger ones that were in the All-Share Index. Not only were returns comparatively low but also the volatility was much higher relative to the dividend paying firms. The maximum drawdown was an eye-watering 85% for the All-Share constituents, with accompanying extreme Ulcer index levels. Amongst the dividend paying firms there is actually little difference in overall return, though the consistent payers exhibit lower volatility and smaller drawdowns. This in turn leads to more favourable Sharpe and Martin ratios. It thus appears that a significant portion of the improvement in absolute return of the consistent dividend growth stocks can be attributed to the avoidance of non-paying firms.
The underperformance of zero-dividend stocks is somewhat surprising. Keim (1985) in the US and Morgan and Thomas (1998) in the UK have previously documented a "U-shaped" relationship between dividend yield and returns, whereby high yield and non-paying stocks have the highest returns. It should be noted however, that Keim (1985) required 60-months of data before a firm qualified for inclusion. When Morgan and Thomas (1998) reduced the qualifying period from 60-months to just 12-months, the performance of zero-dividend firms was considerably worse. This latter result is more comparable with our findings given that no qualification period is imposed for firms to be eligible for study; if a firm has not paid a dividend since listing it is classed as a zero-dividend firm regardless of when it became quoted. occasions over the studied time period although the latter was more volatile. Interestingly, the 5-9 year portfolio has never taken the lead. Whilst the disparity between payers and nonpayers is very large, it does not necessarily equate that all zero-dividend stocks are poor investments. It does seem reasonable that if low quality businesses are being brought to the market there is a high degree of likelihood that they will inhabit the non-paying class of stock.
Bernstein (2005) argues that it is far harder to manipulate cash dividends than accounting earnings and thus it is plausible that dividends contain information over and above that of profits alone.
Additional Dividend Filters
Having observed the performance of consistent dividend growth stocks in aggregate it seems reasonable to consider whether the rate of growth is useful to investors for selecting stocks as a sub-group. According to Gordon's (1962) constant growth model, given two stocks with identical dividend yields, the one with the higher growth rate should trade at a higher price.
Historically, however, it has been well documented that "value" stocks have outperformed "growth" firms with investors overpaying for the latter (e.g. Fama and French, 1998) . Table 5 reports the performance of stocks with a minimum of 10-years consistent dividend growth divided into quartiles based on their historic dividend growth rates over the previous 1 and 5 years for the period 1986-2006. In terms of both 1-year and 5-year growth rates, it is the third quartile that is the best performer in both absolute and risk-adjusted returns. The quartile with the highest growth rates is the worst performer by some distance in both cases. This is consistent with investors paying excessively for the fastest growing businesses; however, apart from this the relationship is one of improved absolute and risk-adjusted returns based on the historical growth rate.
To further investigate the "value" and "growth" aspects of consistent dividend growth stocks we now consider whether any additional filtering using dividend yield can lead to enhanced results. As in Table 5 , we use stocks that have at least 10 years of consistent growth and form quartiles based on dividend yield (with yields being based on the total cash payments made in the previous twelve months). Keim (1985) and Morgan and Thomas (1998) . As dividend yield increases, so does the volatility of returns. After accounting for this, the higher yield portfolios still produce higher Sharpe ratios than lower yield groups. In terms of maximum drawdown, it is actually the lowest yield quartile that suffers the most. It also has the highest Ulcer index of any group and the lowest Martin ratio. The highest yield quartile has the largest drawdown of the remaining three but the Ulcer index is not especially elevated. It also has the largest Martin ratio. When the performance is compared of the highest yield quartile with that of the entire universe of 10-year or more growth stocks in Panel A of Table 2 , it is noticed that whilst the high yield portfolio does produce over 150bps of extra return, the Sharpe ratio is 0.60 and the Martin ratio is 1.09 which are very similar to the values of the aggregate 10-year portfolio at 0.58 and 1.08 respectively.
The far-right column of Table 6 The final filter examined is a combination of the value and growth approaches. One metric that has been used by investment professionals is the price-earnings-growth (PEG) ratio.
There are no definitive rules as to what the ideal value of the PEG ratio should be, but lower numbers are preferable to higher numbers. Lynch (1993) suggests that investors should not buy stocks that have a price-earnings ratio in excess of the growth rate of earnings, i.e. a stock with a PEG below 1 is attractive. Whilst there has been relatively little work published on the PEG ratio as an investment tool, studies by Peters (1991) and Easton (2002) have suggested a negative relationship does exist between the PEG ratio and returns. The problems with applying PEG filtering to the universe of stocks are that, firstly, a good number of stocks have no earnings and hence no PEG and, secondly, a stock that goes from losses one year to profits the next has an incalculable PEG whilst stocks that are emerging from depressed earnings can also have misleading values.
However, the sample of consistent dividend growers lends itself to this sort of analysis because many of the problems discussed previously have already been overcome. To ensure that all firms qualify we test a variant of the PEG ratio, namely the price-dividendgrowth ratio (PDG). It is calculated in exactly the same way as the PEG ratio except that it uses the price-dividend ratio (the inverse of the dividend yield) instead of the price-earnings ratio and the growth rate is the five-year compound annual average increase in dividends. Table 7 displays the results from forming quartiles on the PDG ratio using stocks with 10 or more years of consistent dividend growth. The relationship does appear to be somewhat comparable with previous evidence, with a lower PDG ratio being associated with higher returns. When risk is accounted for, the results appear much weaker, because the Sharpe ratio for the highest PDG portfolio is greater than that of the lowest. The second quartile portfolio has the best risk-adjusted statistics of all quartiles. This approach looks to be less effective than using dividend yield alone.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the effectiveness of investment strategies based on holding portfolios of UK stocks with a history of consistent dividend growth. We find that consistent dividend payers have outperformed the wider market on an equally weighted basis for 1986-2006, particularly when the minimum requirement is set at 10 years of continuous growth. In addition, these stocks have a lower variance of returns and have suffered smaller drawdowns over shorter durations. All the benefits were lost, however, when marketcapitalization weighted portfolios were formed rather than equally weighted. In part, this may have been due to a loss of diversification as a few large stocks dominated, particularly in recent years, as there has been a concentration of dividends. It is observed that a considerable portion of the excess returns available to equally weighted consistent dividend portfolios can be attributed to the avoidance, by definition, of any non-paying stocks during the period studied. Whilst there have been periods of spectacular outperformance by zerodividend firms, over the full period of 1986-2006 they have demonstrated relatively poor returns coupled with markedly higher volatility than dividend paying firms.
The introduction of additional filters produced mixed results. In terms of overall dividend growth, we observe that the companies in the highest quartile of historic growth did not perform especially well. Apart from this, there were greater returns available to purchasing stocks with higher historical growth up to the third quartile on both an absolute and riskadjusted basis. We also find that higher returns were attainable when firms were ranked according to dividend yield, however, the higher yield portfolios also attracted higher volatility and there was essentially no difference between these portfolios and the aggregate portfolio with 10 or more years' consistent dividend growth. When all the firms in the 10-year growth portfolio were yield-weighted, the results were very similar to the equally weighted method albeit with a little more volatility. They remained far superior to the market-capitalization weighting approach. Finally, when a filter based on the price-dividend-growth (PDG) ratio was imposed, in an attempt to combine the value and growth approaches, the results offered no evidence of excess returns to the perceived more favourable low PDG portfolio. All performance statistics were calculated using monthly returns. The Sharpe ratio was measured as the excess return of the portfolio over 3-month UK Treasury Bills divided by the standard deviation of returns. The Ulcer Index and Martin ratio are calculated following the method of Martin and McCann (1989) . 
